RESEARCH
Publications
‘Still at Odds: Partiality and Consequentialism’, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (forthcoming).
‘Couldn’t Be Happier: The Non-Identity Intuition and Valuing People’, Journal of Moral Philosophy, online first (2024).
‘Consequentialism and the Separateness of Persons’, The Philosophical Quarterly, online first (2024).
‘The Individualist Objection: or Why Ex Ante Probabilities Aren’t Always Individualistic‘, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol.12, 2022.
‘Counting People and Making People Count’, Philosophy, Vol. 96, Issue 2, April 2021.
In Progress
A paper on moral optionality, which questions the claim that when agents act optionally, they are required to maximize the good.
A paper on maximization, which challenges the assumption that more value is better than less value.