RESEARCH

Publications

‘Still at Odds: Partiality and Consequentialism’, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (forthcoming).

‘Couldn’t Be Happier: The Non-Identity Intuition and Valuing People’, Journal of Moral Philosophy, online first (2024).

‘Consequentialism and the Separateness of Persons’, The Philosophical Quarterly, online first (2024).

The Individualist Objection: or Why Ex Ante Probabilities Aren’t Always Individualistic‘, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol.12, 2022.

‘Counting People and Making People Count’, Philosophy, Vol. 96, Issue 2, April 2021.

In Progress

A paper on moral optionality, which questions the claim that when agents act optionally, they are required to maximize the good.

A paper on maximization, which challenges the assumption that more value is better than less value.